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Battle of Midway (1942)
Location: Near the Midway Islands
Date: 4 – 6 June 1942
Field Forces: United States against the Japanese Empire
Outcome: US Tactical and Strategic Victory
Commanders: United States of America: Frank Fletcher, Raymond Spruance and Chester Nimitz – Japanese Empire: Chuichi Nagumo and Isoroku Yamamoto
The scenery:
After Pearl Harbor, Japan had achieved a succession of successes both on land and at sea, but the country’s great military strategy remained the result of a compromise between the army’s vision, which focused on China and eventually saw Russia as an enemy to be beaten and that of the navy, for which instead the real danger was constituted by the United States. For this reason a wide defensive perimeter had to be created and control of the maritime communication routes had to be achieved and occupied, or at least neutralized, all the US allies in the region, starting from Australia. But the army did not want to make the necessary, substantial ground forces available for these projects. That is why, instead of landing in force and the occupation of Australia, the navy was forced to settle for conquering positions of control and threat, with the operation MO against Australia, which was later abandoned after the Battle of the Sea of the Corals.
The commander of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto, however, had focused attention on a different offensive operation: the conquest of the Midway Islands, which represented the bait with which to attract and annihilate the American fleet in a crash on the high seas. . Midway would then be used to exert pressure and control over Hawaii. All in the (misplaced) hope that a new defeat would have led the United States to find a negotiating agreement and to end the hostilities. The army obviously had nothing to object, since they only asked for a small contribution to Midway’s occupation force. On the other hand, the naval staff was not at all enthusiastic, it feared the extreme complexity and risks, also highlighted in some “war games”. But Yamamoto threatened to resign if his project had not been approved and had won the match, also because the demonstration raid conducted on April 19 by the bombers of Jimmy Doolittle, launched by the carrier Hornet and arrived to hit Tokyo, Yokohama, Nosoya and Kobe, had had a profound effect on the Japanese, who wanted to “close” the door through which the American naval formations passed. That door was Midway.
Field Forces:
After Pearl Harbor, the US Pacific fleet was in a state of clear numerical inferiority and in some respects qualitative compared to the Japanese. This had not prevented courageous offensive actions, raids and the decisive contrast of Japanese operations. In particular, Tokyo had suffered a first check during the Battle of the Coral Sea. With Operation MO the Japanese navy set out to conquer the island of Tulagi in the Solomon Islands and to disembark at Port Moresby in New Guinea. But the Americans were ready to prevent it. In the resulting battle, the first naval battle fought only by aircraft carriers, the Japanese lost a light aircraft carrier, the Soho, but above all they had the seriously damaged Shokaku and the private Zuikaku of a good part of its air group. The Americans lost the Lexington, a team aircraft carrier and a second unit was badly damaged, the Yorktown, but this ship was miraculously repaired in time to take part in the Battle of Midway, while for the Japanese the lack of two large aircraft carriers was to prove fatal . For the Battle of Midway Nimitz could count on two aircraft carrier Task Forces, the TF 16 with two aircraft carriers, Enterprise and Hornet, escorted by 2 heavy cruisers and 11 destroyers and the TF 17 with the Yorktown, escorted by 2 heavy cruisers and 6 destroyers.
Nimitz had ruled out using the few battleships available. In fact, the Americans had a fourth, unsinkable aircraft carrier: the island of Midway, whose airborne and terrestrial defenses had been reinforced, while 120 heterogeneous aircraft had been concentrated on its tracks. To defend the Aleutians only the TF 8 was available, with 5 cruisers and 10 destroyers. But perhaps Nimitz’s most precious ally was Hypo, the codename of Hawaii’s intelligence center, led by frigate captain Joseph Rochefort, who had managed to uncover much of the secrets of the Japanese JN25 code. The JN25 will then be changed just before the battle, but Hypo is still able to provide Nimitz with invaluable information, according to which Nimitz forges their own plans. For the operation against Midway Yamamoto could count on a huge fleet, almost 200 ships. Ground-based aircraft were added to these forces. His plan, however, was very complex and the excessive confidence led him to subdivide too much his forces, to which different tasks were assigned. The Fifth Fleet was to execute Operation AL, the diversion attack on the Aleutians, with 2 light aircraft carriers, 4 armored vehicles, 3 heavy cruisers, 4 light cruisers, 24 destroyers, submarines, transport ships and support. For Operation MI on Midway there was the Second Fleet with the task of invading the two islands, with the Zuiho light aircraft carrier, 2 battleships, 8 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 21 destroyers, 12 transports with 5,000 soldiers on board. Then there was the first aircraft attack force, with the 4 team units Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu escorted by 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 12 destroyers as well as the First Fleet, the main force, with 3 battleships, 1 light aircraft carrier, 1 light cruiser, 9 destroyers and auxiliary units. All these formations had to move apart, spaced hundreds of miles from each other. Above all, the Japanese admiral continued to believe that aircraft carriers were important elements, but not the core of naval warfare. This is confirmed by the fact that the crucial element of the attack forces for Midway was represented by the armored group, on which Yamamoto stood. The aircraft carriers had to take the road to the battleships in April, which would have led the decisive battle. Yamamoto thought he could launch the attack on Midway, to occupy them, while his aircraft carriers and armored would have eliminated in a big battle the American naval forces, in particular the aircraft carriers, mobilized to defend the islands.
The battle:
If the Japanese were counting on the surprise effect, and they did not know they had lost it before their ships came out of the ports, the Americans only enjoying the surprise could accept the fight and only succeeded in inflicting a blow that was to be knocked first. out. The advantage Nimitz enjoyed was that of knowing what his opponents’ main objective was, as well as the secondary one of diversion. In Nimitz it was also known when the enemy attack would have been launched, its consistency and the rough direction of the Yamamoto fleet, so it made its aircraft carriers move in time which, due to this advance and a series of coincidences, escaped both to submarine screens and to Japanese scouts. Yamamoto and Nagumo, however, proceeded without worrying too much, in the belief that American ships would have been in case after the attack on Midway, certainly not before. On June 13, the various Japanese teams are getting closer to their goals. In the early hours of the morning, the carriers Ryujo and Junyo attack the installations of Dutch Harbor, starting the AL operation in the Aleutians. Meanwhile, at 9 in the morning, a Catalina reconnaissance from Midway sees what he considers to be the main group of the Japanese fleet. Instead, it is the invasion force of Admiral Tanaka who is 600 miles from the island. Even the Japanese are aware of the plane and warn Yamamoto. Bombardment attacks on Tanaka ships are fired from Midway, without success; only the next day is the torpedo of an oil tanker by another Catalina. Fletcher and his aircraft carriers receive from Nimitz the confirmation that it is not the main force, which instead will attack the next day, at dawn and from the north-west.
The American aircraft carriers sail to get 200 miles north of Midway, waiting for the necessary information to hit. Meanwhile, the aircraft carriers of Nagumo have reached the necessary distance to launch their attack: 108 planes took off starting from 04.00. Immediately after the Japanese ships are launched scouts that have to cover over a 180 ° arc sectors from north to south, to find out the presence of American ships. There are delays, technical problems and in any case the number of aircraft assigned is insufficient to obtain a real coverage: still an excess of confidence. In Midway, meanwhile, the radar detects enemy planes at a distance of 90 miles, a reconnaissance sighting the Japanese main fleet already at 5.20. From Midway take off all the aircraft available, except B-17 bombers already departed to the force of Tanaka, while the two American Task Forces close the gap, with 10 scouts ahead of them. The Japanese ships are 180 miles from Midway, the American ships are still 200 miles away. At 06.20 Midway fighters attack Japanese airplanes: 25 American fighters are shot down, 25 Japanese aircraft hit an empty airport and various targets and retreat around 7, but the commander Tomonaga is not satisfied with the damage done and asks in Nagumo to launch a second attack. Shortly thereafter, the first American planes taken off from Midway arrive on Japanese ships, with no hunting coverage, because Buffalo and Wildcat, contrary to what Nimitz ordered, remained to protect their base. The Japanese Zero have such a good game, knock down 7 of the top 10 American attack planes. Nagumo decides that he really needs a second attack on Midway, orders that the aircraft left in the aircraft carriers, ready to attack with torpedoes and bombs drilling American ships, are reported in the hangars to mount fragmentation bombs. He does not change his mind even when a scout finally sees a group of American ships. The message arrives around 07.35. At 7.48 a second formation of planes departed from Midway comes into action: no better luck, 8 out of 16 dive bombers Dauntless are shot down, the others do not hit any ship, as well as the B-17 bombers aimed at the new target when they were already flying to Tanaka ships. No center even for the 9 old Mariner Vindicators.
It seems that everything goes well for the Japanese when, at 08.30, the reconnaissance that follows the American ships signals to have seen an aircraft carrier. There is no doubt, we must change the plans. The alternative is between launching an attack against US ships with aircraft equipped for terrestrial targets, but almost without hunting escort, because the Zero have been engaged in the defense of Japanese ships, or wait for the return of the planes of the first wave, which begin to be seen, and in the meantime bring back the planes of the second wave in the hangars and change their armaments again. Since an attack on American aircraft carriers without hunting protection would have little chance of success, Nagumo opts for the second solution. He then orders that as soon as the planes returning from Midway have been recovered, the fleet changes course, proceeds east-north-east at high speed, approaching the American ships. An important decision. In fact, on the American side Admiral Fletcher has ordered Spruance to attack as soon as he has precise information on the position of the enemy with the air groups of Enterprise and Hornet; he will launch his planes when he has a more precise picture. Almost 120 planes departed from the Spruance ships at 07.00, followed by Fletcher’s Yorktown planes at 08.30. And the route that follows them must lead them to the appointment with the Japanese fleet, assuming that this has maintained course and speed. So when they reach the point, Hornet planes, 35 Dauntless bombers and 10 Wildcat fighters, find nothing, go south and then return to their ship or land in Midway or again, in the case of fighters, they are forced to ditching, having run out of fuel. A second group of Hornet airplanes, 15 Devastator air torpedoes and 10 fighters chose instead to aim north and not south … and at 9.20 find the prey and start the attack. All the Devastators are shot down by fighters and anti-aircraft. Now attack the colleagues of the Enterprise, 14 Devastator. 11 are those killed, others launch the torpedoes without striking. At 10.15 comes the attack group of Yorktown but, because of clouds and radio problems, fails to attack in a coordinated and simultaneous.
Only 12 Devastators get underneath, with 6 escort fighters. It’s a new massacre, as soon as 2 planes survive and no torpedo goes on target. But now it’s up to the dive bombers, there are the 37 Dauntless of the Enterprise who have chosen to look for the ships of Nagumo to the north, not south, and now they have found them. Even the 17 Dauntless of the Hornet are ready. The first attack from the south-west, the latter from the south-east. And they have the surprise of not waiting for the Zero, who have fallen at low altitude to hunt the torpedoes, while the Japanese ships are scattered and can not create that wall of fire that has massacred the first American groups. The Dauntless beat almost vertically, drop the bombs and hit the center: 4 bombs on the Kaga, then 2 on the Akagi and then another 2 on the Soryu. The explosion of the bombs is devastating, but perhaps it would not be lethal if it did not provoke a chain reaction between Japanese planes on flight decks, almost ready to take off, loaded with bombs and torpedoes, as well as in hangars, where other aircraft are supplied where 800 kg bombs are stacked. The three aircraft carriers are shaken by explosions and fires. They will sink in the evening or at dawn the next day, bringing in their boats 1,800 between sailors and naval aviators. The Japanese still have an aircraft carrier, the Hiryu, which launches at 10.58 the first of two weak formations of attack, formed by 18 dive bombers Val and 6 Zero fighters. They are guided against Task Force 17 and Yorktown by the indications of a seaplane, which shades American ships. There are 13 Vals shot down by Wildcats and anti-aircraft, but 5 manage to pass and 3 bombs hit Yorktown. Serious damage, but the ship is still able to sail and fight. At 13.31 Hiryu launches its latest aircraft, 10 torpedoes Kate and 6 Zero. The defenses knock down 5 torpedoes and 3 fighters, but the others continue and place 2 torpedoes, while a Kate crashes voluntarily on the Yorktown flight deck.
The American ship is abandoned, but it does not sink and on June 5 even try to save it, but at 13 a Japanese submarine, the I-168 launches it against 4 torpedoes: two center the aircraft carrier, one the destroyer Herman, both the ships sink. But even Hiryu can not get away with it. In the afternoon of the 4th she was spotted by an American reconnaissance and at 15.30, Enterprise and Hornet launched them against 40 Dauntless, without hunting escort. The American planes arrive surprising the Japanese, who are intent on preparing a last attack with the 15 planes that remained on board. The Hiryu is centered by 4 bombs, it will sink on 5 June, with 416 members of its crew. Yamamoto, after the news of the sinking of 3 of the aircraft carrier of Nagumo, still considers it possible to recover: cancel the operation AL, recalls the Second Fleet of Kondo to bring it back to its Main Force, order the aircraft carriers Ryujo and Junyo to try to reach it, although he soon realizes that they will not arrive before June 6th. He then ordered four cruisers led by Admiral Kurita to advance towards Midway to bomb her at night. Plan a night battle, specialty of the Japanese navy. But the American admirals withdrew to the east just to prevent this, with the intention of returning to the scene 5 to hit again. At 5am Yamamoto learns that even the fourth carrier of Nagumo has sunk. At 19.15 he knows that American ships are retiring. At 2:55 am on June 5th, he canceled the MI operation and ordered the reunification of the forces and the general withdrawal. But it is not over yet. In the early hours of June 5, the four heavy cruisers of Kurita, Mogami, Mikuma, Kumano, Suzuya are just 80 miles from Midway and due to an emergency maneuver to escape a supposed submarine Mogami and Mikuma collide, with serious damage. They continue on their own at 12 knots, escorted by 2 fighters. At 06.30 a Catalina sees them and at 8 am attacked by Midway aircraft, without success, but a Vindicator crashes on Mikuma. On 6 June, the aircraft of Hornet and Enterprise close the game with the Mikuma, which sinks with 300 sailors, while the Mogami miraculously survives 6 bombs and repairs in the base of Truk.
Losses and Consequences:
For Japan, the defeat of Midway was a disaster, marked the end of the offensive phase: if you exclude minor operations now Tokyo, deprived of its best aeronaval forces, especially the elite of its drivers, irreplaceable, would be forced to a defensive strategy. As for the United States, they could now look with confidence at the war in the Pacific, even if it would take years and bitter and bloody battles to win back the lost land and directly threaten the Japanese archipelago. In Midway the Japanese navy lost 4 team aircraft carriers and a heavy cruiser, while a second was badly damaged, 2 destroyers were damaged. The total number of aircraft lost were 332. On the US side the losses amounted to a team aircraft carrier, a hunter, 147 aircraft and significant but reparable damage to the military installations of the Midway Islands. These numbers indicate how even at the tactical level, as well as on the strategic level, the Japanese defeat was very heavy.
